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INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the findings of a technical assessment 
mission performed by Frederick C. Cuny, an INTERTECT consultant for 
the Agency for International Development.
Objectives
The objectives of the mission were:
A. to assist in the assessment of overall progress in providing 
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon;
B. to identify specific problems that still face the emergency 
assistance program;
^ • to identify specific problems that may be encountered during the 
transition from emergency activities to establishment of normal 
operations;
D. to assist AID and the Bureau of Refugee Programs, Department of 
State (RP) in assessing the quality of assistance to the 
refugees;
E. to assist in identification of lessons from the Lebanese opera­
tions that can help expand emergency preparedness planning for 
future operations.
Site Visits
During this assessment the following refugee camps were 
visited :*
Rashidiyah (Tyre): 85% destroyed
Burj ash-Shamali (Tyre): 15% destroyed 
al—Buss (Tyre): 8% destroyed 
Ayn al—Hilwah (Sidon): 95% destroyed 
Miyah-Miyah (Sidon): No Damage 
Burj al-Barajinah (Beirut): 12% destroyed 
Sabra (Beirut): 10% destroyed (not a camp, but a refu­
gee neighborhood in the city)
Shatila (Beirut): 10% destroyed 
Mar Elias (Beirut): 5% destroyed
*A11 damage figures from UNRWA sources.
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Period of Performance
The assessment mission was conducted 7-15 December 1982. Due to 
the short time period involved, on-site verification of claims made 
or data provided by participating engineers was not entirely possi­
ble; thus the observations and analysis herein reflect only a quali­
tative and not a quantitative evaluation. Figures or statistics 
quoted are those provided by the agencies and were not developed by 
the consultant unless otherwise noted.
Disclaimer
The observations in this report are those of the consultant and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of AID, the Department of State 
or Bureau of Refugee Programs.
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OVERALL OBSERVATIONS
A. Number of Refugees: In all camps in Sidon and Tyre except
Rashidiyah*, the number of refugees and refugee families appears 
to be equal to or slightly more than the numbers shown by UNRWA 
on its registration lists (last developed in 1975). In Beirut, 
the number of refugees is difficult to estimate but, due to the 
surrounding urban environment and ease of access and egress, the 
number is probably much greater than officially listed. However 
these people are unlikely to be in need of assistance as they 
are being sheltered by friends and relatives.** Registration of 
Palestinians by UNRWA has always been a confusing issue due to 
UNRWA's continued use of the 1950 registration system wherein 
families "not in need" were not registered. This has enabled 
people who both did and did not want to be counted for various 
purposes to do so. However, unregistered refugees have been 
included by UNRWA where possible for determining program 
needs, and the figures are as accurate as possible under the 
circumstances.
According to the UNRWA Lebanon Deputy Director, the agency plans 
to change registration procedures in the near future. This move 
should be encouraged, but care must be taken to ensure that the 
new system is flexible and will permit those displaced and un­
*In Rashidiyah, the number of refugees is probably much less than 
official estimates. This is due to the distance from the city which 
makes people feel vulnerable and isolated from work. The level of 
self-help reconstruction is far less than in other camps and it is 
estimated that many have left the camp to find work in Beirut.
**Most of the 1970 influx of PLO supporters who entered Lebanon from 
Jordan are believed to have "gone to the north", to the Biqa' Valley 
and Tripoli. While some movement of fighters certainly took place 
(UNRWA now reports a 25% increase in camp population in the north), 
most of the displaced refugees are probably in the Beirut area.
There are no reports of major overcrowding in the northern camps and 
no new camps are reported by volag sources in the area. Thus it 
should be anticipated that in future programs, the number of 
Palestinians in the Beirut area will probably increase substantially, 
especially if permission is obtained for 1970 refugees to remain 
(which is unlikely at the present time). If such permission is not 
officially extended, large numbers will remain outside the UNRWA 
assistance system and aid programs will have to treat these people as 
"squatters" or illegal aliens, if they are allowed to remain in the 
country.
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willing or unable to register at present to obtain new documents 
in the future. No re-registration or new registration activity 
should proceed unless UNRWA has assurances that re—registration 
will not be used as a means of complicating protection and 
residency by the Government of Lebanon.
B. Difficulties Due to Politics and/or Security Considerations:
1. Assistance Program Operations. Overall the delivery of
assistance to refugees in the camps has not been seriously 
hampered by security considerations. Individual concerns 
have arisen, of course, but in comparison to past opera­
tions, including those in Lebanon, agencies have not been 
overly delayed or hindered.
Figure 1: Israeli Security Patrol in Ayn al-Hilwah
2. Politically-Related Difficulties. Uncertainty over long­
term status of the Palestinian refugees has prompted UNRWA 
and other agencies to act cautiously regarding various 
aspects of the assistance program. Most affected is the 
physical reconstruction of the camps and the shelter pro­
gram. First, UNRWA was prevented from obtaining or 
utilizing aerial photos of the camps that would have aided
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the engineering staff in developing plans or estimates of 
clearance requirements. While this work could have been 
done from ground surveys, aerials could have greatly 
speeded the work and provided a basis for land platting and 
subdivision. (As will be noted later, platting was not 
done until early December, and land ownership and resettle­
ment are expected to be a major problem.)
Second, UNRWA has felt it necessary to move cautiously.
The agency initially attempted to provide tents as a tem­
porary shelter rather than help the refugees rebuild more 
permanent housing. (See Housing Section for further com­
ments .)
Another factor that has contributed to slowing the pace of 
reconstruction is the absence of men. Many are in the 
north with the PLO or hiding out in other cities. Several 
thousand are in the Ansar detention center of the IDF, and 
many were evacuated during the disengagement. This has 
meant that most rebuilding must be carried out by older men 
and the women in the camps. Thus, the quality of housing 
construction and repair is even worse than usual and is 
much slower in comparison with other operations.*
C. Funding: The level of funding for the overall relief opera­
tion to the Palestinians appears to be adequate for the numbers 
mentioned. In the housing sector, disbursements for the exis­
ting UNRWA program will probably not be as great as anticipated. 
Unless the level of assistance is to be increased (either the 
cash or material contribution) or unless other refugees are 
included in an expanded registration and UNRWA wishes to esta­
blish reserves for such an eventuality, housing set-asides are 
more than sufficient. Additional funds do not need to be 
allocated for the existing program.
D. Levels of Expertise: As in any operation there are varying
levels of expertise and professionalism demonstrated by the 
quality and efficiency of the assistance program. The following 
is an assessment of the level of expertise demonstrated in each 
sector of activity.
*Official delays and indecision regarding Palestinian tenure delayed 
actual reconstruction for only a short period. Self-help reconstruc­
tion has proceeded in all camps, albeit at different speeds, without 
regard for official or UNRWA actions and is moving along well despite 
hardships noted above.
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1. Planning and Camp Design. Despite UNRWA's claims to have 
ample expertise and experience in camp planning, there were 
few or no demonstrated capabilities in this field. Even at 
this date, no land survey exists; no land use plan, occu­
pant tenure or ownership data has been developed; and no 
comprehensive plans for camp reconstruction or development 
have been formulated.
2. Engineering. Despite the lack of planning, basic engin­
eering was good. The engineering staff did a credible job 
of supervising debris removal, cleaning and re-grading, and 
terracing of specific areas. Water system installation, 
basic drainage and surfacing of roads were carried out at a 
fairly good pace with no undue problems and all should be 
completed on or about the projected schedule. Constant 
turnover of the engineering staff (most of whom were con­
tractors selected from a roster of engineers willing to 
volunteer for short-term assignments in disasters) may have 
caused some delays and certainly increased the costs. 
Resident engineers on 6-month contracts should have been 
retained.
Supervision and inspection of engineering sub-contracts by 
the UNRWA field engineer appears to have been good. No 
major cost overruns were encountered, and the higher-than- 
bid costs on most work are surprisingly low given the 
strengthening of the Lebanese pound and the inflationary 
environment.
3. Sanitation. Expertise in sanitation is lacking. Basic 
refugee camp systems were known to the field engineer, but 
state-of-the-art designs/systems were not.
4. SheIter/Housing. No expertise was evident in this area.
5. Medical Programs. Ample expertise and experience was 
evident in curative health and general medicine, although 
procedures appear to be cumbersome and may cause unneces­
sary delays. The proposed screening unit at Sidon could 
have helped in the emergency. Despite UNRWA claims that 
preventative (public health) measures in support of health 
programs are being undertaken on a regular basis, there was 
little evidence of this in the camps. Most lacking was 
participation of sanitarians and public health engineers.
6. Feeding Programs. The pre-war system of supplementary 
feeding has been retained. However, no monitoring was evi­
dent at the two centers visited (Shatila and Ayn al- 
Hilwah). Adjustments to this program and establishment of 
a local statistical analysis capability that could help the
6
medical team to establish a better picture of the health 
status of the camp should be encouraged.
7. Social Services. Not observed.
E. Observations on the Role of UNRWA:
1. Assistance. Throughout the emergency, UNRWA has insisted 
that it should be the focal point for all assistance to 
Palestinians in the camps. In essence, this makes them 
responsible for coordination of relief efforts, the quality 
of aid, the standard of relief, and the overseeing of equi­
table distribution. Following are observations on these 
intangible aspects of the relief effort:
a. Standard of Assistance: The relief operations for
Palestinians are somewhat unique in that they are for 
refugees already living in refugee settlements. Much 
of the operation is a reconstruction effort coupled 
with reinstatement of existing services. Thus,
UNRWA’s delivery of services and materials may be com­
pared with both the pre-war levels of service and the 
standard of services delivered to refugees in other 
operations. Overall, the standard of the aid and ser­
vices delivered is higher than other comparable relief 
operations. The UNRWA staff is familiar with basic 
feeding, medical and health programs. Thus, much of 
the effort has been devoted to restarting and expand­
ing existing programs. In medical, health and feeding 
programs, UNRWA may have been slow to respond to some 
needs, but the basic standard of service was high 
(even if incredibly bureaucratic) and UNRWA has 
strived to return to pre-war levels.
In the environmental sector, UNRWA’s emergency res­
ponse was quite poor. Planning was virtually non­
existent; engineering was uncoordinated in the early 
stages; site services and housing reconstruction 
planning was never fully integrated; and contingency 
planning was non-existent. It is a credit to the 
engineering staff that they were able to accomplish so 
much and to proceed without more back-up. Yet so much 
more could have been done with a more balanced staff. 
At a minimum, a site planner, a structural engineer 
and a sanitation engineer should have been added to 
the team from the very beginning.
b. Diversity of Assistance: Good emergency programs
are characterized by the diversity of services offer­
ed. Overall, most sectors of concern in the emergency
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received some degree of attention. Notable exceptions 
are epidemiological monitoring and environmental sani­
tation control.
c. Program Integration/Coordination: UNRWA's objec­
tives in the relief operations were to restore 
previous levels of service. Few of the programs seem 
to have made allowances for variations in the stan­
dards required by emergency needs. For example, 
supplementary feeding programs are generally viewed as 
the prime health monitoring and assessment vehicle in 
emergency operations. Supplementary feeding centers 
become the focal points for collecting and assessing 
health, epidemiological and social welfare data, and 
close coordination is maintained among not only 
nutrition and health staff but also with engineering, 
sanitation and vector control personnel. This was not 
the case in this operation. Services were provided 
independently and with only informal coordination 
between sectors (this usually at the Beirut level).
In essence, services can be characterized as "fire­
fighting" and sector-focused, rather than as a sophis­
ticated and integrated attack on problems.
Part of the problem can be found in the UNRWA organi­
zation chart. The field offices and various opera­
tional departments each have separate lines of 
authority (see Appendix i). This structure would be 
difficult to operate even if the entire office were in 
Lebanon or the Middle East, but with the Headquarters 
in Europe, it is impossible.
d. Equity of Distribution: A major task in any relief
operation is to ensure that all aid recipients receive 
assistance on an equitable basis. In the delivery of 
relief supplies, medical and nutritional services, 
UNRWA appears to have done exceedingly well. Only in 
the housing sector have there been major problems (due 
to slow replatting and delays in the assignment of 
available land).
2. Protection. UNRWA maintains that protection of refugees 
under the terms of international law is not within their 
social welfare mandate. Such a position may be technically 
correct, but operationally every humanitarian organization 
has a responsibility in this effort. While direct protec­
tion may not be possible, indirect protection is achiev­
able. There are many things that UNRWA could and should 
do; establishing a [large] expatriate presence in the camps 
to serve as de facto observers in order to deter
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incidents against the refugees; providing expatriates to 
serve as links between refugees and occupation authori­
ties, and providing foreign staff who can stand up to 
economic exploitation of the refugees by local contractors, 
are all roles that UNRWA can play. Such indirect protec­
tive and advocacy roles have largely been ignored by the 
agency. Had a large-scale international presence been in 
the Beirut camps, the Sabra/Shatila massacres might have 
been avoided.
Even in minor cases, UNRWA has been lacking. In Ayn al- 
Hilwah a local contractor boldly entered the camp with 
heavy equipment, claimed a portion of the land belonged to 
him, excavated the top soil and dug a deep pit in the very 
middle of the camp. UNRWA failed to challenge his right to 
the land and not until a week later, after a 7-meter-deep, 
20m x 35m hole had been dug, did they realize that UNRWA 
owned the site.
3. Preparedness to Handle the Emergency. Despite affirma­
tions to the contrary, UNRWA was unprepared to handle the 
emergency operations. Most important, a trained and exper­
ienced cadre of field officers and staff was not available. 
In the past, most field work was handled by the PLO, the 
Palestinian Red Crescent, or Palestinian staff. Under the 
conditions imposed by the emergency, a new modus operandi 
was required. UNRWA should have had contingency plans for 
such an event, a small expatriate staff of technicians to 
plan and execute emergency operations, and pre-determined 
agreements with voluntary agency partners to supply emer­
gency services or materials. In this emergency UNRWA may 
be likened to an army of officers without sergeants and 
corporals to carry out the orders. With the frequency of 
such events, UNRWA should have created a small emergency 
unit and corps of reserve or on-call specialists that could 
handle field operations.
4. Understaffing. UNRWA was not staffed to handle field 
operations. A review of the staffing patterns points to 
some of the difficulties. In the overall organization, 
less than 2% of the entire professional staff is assigned 
responsibilities for emergency assistance. In the Lebanon 
Field Office, various people were obviously pressed into 
emergency service, but few had any emergency training. In 
an emergency it is important that a high percentage of the 
field staff be expatriates (for reasons of neutrality, 
security and protection), yet there were only a few 
expatriates employed by the Lebanese Field Office and most 
of these were short-term contractors or staff brought in 
from Vienna on short-term assignments. In order to
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properly serve the changing needs of the refugees, a larger 
and more professional expatriate staff should have been 
present.
5. Leadership and Control. Two qualities that an agency 
serving as a focal point for assistance must exhibit are 
leadership and command. In leadership, UNRWA receives fair 
marks, although it constantly had to be prodded by other 
agencies in certain sectors. In terms of command of the 
situation, UNRWA receives mixed marks. In camp development 
and reconstruction, it is obvious that no degree of control 
has been established. Unfortunately, UNRWA administrators 
failed to anticipate the need for swift and comprehensive 
land use and tenure mapping or the need to quickly develop 
camp plans. Thus, land disputes are already starting to 
occur.
6. Coordination. As lead agency, UNRWA automatically 
becomes the coordinator for humanitarian assistance to 
refugees. In the broad sense, UNRWA performed this service 
both as host of meetings for coordinators at various levels 
and as a de facto central clearinghouse for information. 
Coordination is more than information-sharing, however, and 
in an operational sense UNRWA failed to integrate activi­
ties at the field level. Most important, UNRWA failed to 
provide a basis for coordination by conducting a detailed 
analysis of needs and matching them with services. As 
noted earlier, most aid was piecemeal, in response to needs 
as they arose.
F. Operational Problems of the Relief Operation in General:
1. Lack of Preparedness. As usual, few agencies were pre­
pared to handle the emergency. Few have sent experienced 
staff and many lessons have been relearned.
2. Competition Among Agencies. Competition among agencies 
was not as extensive as in past operations but rivalries 
and failure to share resources and information did hamper 
assistance to a limited extent. More harmful was UNRWA's 
attitude in public that they had the situation in control 
and could do everything. This was clearly not the case.
3. Overemphasis on Medical Aid. Emergency medical aid and 
curative medicine is normally a short-lived need, yet most 
agencies have continued to provide these services far be­
yond the normal time. Preventive medicine and public 
health measures have not received the emphasis required 
either by UNRWA or the volags. Rehabilitation therapy and 
crisis counseling have also received less attention. In
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general, the clear emphasis has been on medical aid to the 
detriment of a balanced relief program.
4. Welfare Mentality. It has been the policy of the relief 
agencies to provide all services completely free of charge. 
A small percentage of refugees have been employed by relief 
agencies but most are recipients of continuous gifts. Even 
before the war, a kind of Palestinian welfare state existed 
and it appears that a return to the old system is being en­
couraged. While it is recognized that many of the services 
normally provided are similar to those provided in many 
European countries, it could be argued that the extent of 
these services is extravagant beyond certain points. For 
example, current plans are to continue supplementary feed­
ing programs for all children under five indefinitely. 
Feeding may be required for selected cases but, as long as 
basic rations are sufficient, certainly not universal sup­
plemental feeding.
Another concern in this regard is the lack of sophistica­
tion in distributing supplies and services. Agencies 
simply give everything away. This means there is no incen­
tive for people to do things collectively in the camps. 
While some items should be donated, work programs should be 
established in conjunction with distribution of major items 
and services.
5. Monitoring and Assessment. Initial assessments of damage 
and needs were relatively superficial and did not provide 
program planners with data upon which to plan projects. 
While the general data provided was helpful to indicate 
general sectors of need, numerous agencies reported that it 
was necessary to conduct their own assessments in order to 
develop the data for their planning needs.
Data collection for monitoring the program has recently 
been reestablished, although statistical analysis in health 
and nutrition is conducted in Vienna and is reportedly not 
returned to Beirut.
6. Communications. The Government of Lebanon has prevented 
establishment of an electronic communications (radio) net­
work. This has caused numerous delays and problems in co­
ordination. (An interagency courier service could have 
been established, however).
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SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS
Land allocation is the most critical issue in the big southern 
camps at this time. Due to lack of planning and control, it is esti­
mated that between 10%-15% of the people currently in the heavily 
devastated camps will not receive land when it is reapportioned.
Added to this is the fact that, in Sidon, approximately 30% of the 
land used by Palestinians before the war was illegally occupied and 
is currently being reclaimed by the Lebanese (with assistance from 
the Israelis). Furthermore, there are reports that some people from 
Tyre are moving to Ayn al-Hilwah. If others return as expected, the 
problem will become even more critical.
A. Site Planning and Land Allocation: Comprehensive site plan­
ning is required whenever land is to be reapportioned or when 
clearance activities are of such an extent as to erase normal 
boundary markers. In three camps (Ayn al-Hilwah, Rashidiyah and 
Burj ash-Shamali) extensive grading took place, and in two (Ayn 
al-Hilwah and Burj ash-Shamali) the basic land contours were 
changed in various parts of the camp. In these areas, land was 
replatted and is being reapportioned. Yet until December no 
site planning was carried out.
1. Land Surveys. The engineering staff complained that land 
ownership data was not provided until late in the program. 
This information in the form of both legal descriptions and 
maps should have been the first data provided to the engi­
neers.* Aerial photos of the post-disaster sites would 
also have been useful, but for political reasons these 
could not be obtained in IDF-controlled areas. In this 
case, ground surveys should have been carried out as the 
first step and periodically revised as changes were made. 
These would have served as a basis for reapportioning land 
and developing estimates of space available for housing and 
other facilities.
2. Cadastral Surveys. When dealing with land issues, it is 
important to know land use, land tenure patterns, ownership 
boundaries, and location of buildings before and after the 
damage. This data is usually developed and presented in 
the form of a map. It is from this map and the topographic 
data that any changes in the camp design, land use or 
tenure patterns are made.
*Engineers noted that the maps that were provided were inaccurate.
12
3. Camp Designs/Redesign. In most camps redesign was simply 
not possible nor desirable. The best approach was to treat 
the situation as a reconstruction program, and this is what 
UNRWA did. In two cases (Ayn al-Hilwah and Burj ash- 
Shamali) grading and filling necessitated some reapportion­
ment of the land and did require some replatting. In 
Rashidiyah, large-scale clearance also required replatting. 
In all these cases, there was an opportunity to do some in­
novative design work, but UNRWA elected to do simple 
"straight line" layouts and not to alter the basic layout 
of the camps. In retrospect, while not innovative, the de­
cisions in each case cannot be faulted.
4. Replatting. In the graded areas, it was necessary to re­
plat the land so that it could be reapportioned. The major 
concern was to ensure equitable distribution of the remain­
ing land area. Th^ cleared land was divided into parcels 
approximately 100m *. The staff did not seem to consider 
prior land uses in the replatting, nor were allowances made 
for assignment or development of sites in prime locations. 
For example, sites at intersections of major roads would be 
ideal for small stores and service centers. Yet these are 
often the smallest land areas and are noted on the map with 
the same classification as the other sites.
5. Reassignment of the Land. The task of reapportioning the 
land was given to a committee of school teachers who re­
ceived no instructions other than to do it as fairly as 
possible and to see that large families received the larg­
est plots. Most have tried to put people back on the sites 
they occupied before the war; however, the recontouring, 
grading and replatting have made this difficult. Realiza­
tion that land boundaries were no longer recognizable led 
many refugees to amplify their chosen site as soon as it 
was cleared and before reapportioning commenced. In Ayn 
al-Hilwah over half of the land was taken before UNRWA 
could begin reapportionment. In practical terms, this 
means that a few families control the larger and best sites 
while the rest will have to accept smaller plots on the re­
maining land and some families will be squeezed out.
*An UNRWA standard agreed upon in the 1969 Cairo Agreement. In this 
Agreement, responsibility for assisting all Palestinians in camps was 
turned over to the PLO. Under the terms of the agreement, UNRWA was 
to continue to serve as the U.N. and international coordinator for 
donors but to turn operational responsibility and control of assis­
tance over to Palestinians.
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Figure 2: Teacher Redistributing Land in Ayn al-Hilwah
In operational terras, this means UNRWA has lost control of 
the site's development. This will cause problems in the 
future and could have been anticipated. It is the most 
important reason for UNRWA to have had camp planners 
working with the engineering team from the beginning. Land 
disputes can be expected to be a major problem. It should 
be remembered that most reapportionment is taking place in 
the absence of large numbers of heads-of-household. When 
these men return, land disputes may become even more 
serious.
Figure 3: Example of Uncontrolled Expansion of a Site
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6. Land Apportionment Standard. In the reassignment of 
land^ UNRWA has attempted to give each family approximately 
100m of land. In normal times, this standard would be 
quite reasonable; however, given the need to find room for 
more people on less land, the standard could have been re­
duced without too much hardship on the Palestinians and 
more space would have been available. For example, in ^yn 
al-Hil^ah a reduction of the standard by 20% (from 100m 
to 80m ) would probably have enabled UNRWA to accomodate 
most of the people whom the present distribution will not 
cover. Again, had this been done from the outset, land 
would not be as critical an issue as it will be.
B. Site Clearance:
1. Status. Almost all site clearance activities in the
camps have been completed and regrading has virtually end­
ed. No problems other than those mentioned in earlier 
reports were encountered. Demolition and filling of 
damaged air raid shelters proceeded much faster than ori­
ginally expected. UNRWA engineers should be cited for 
bringing this activity to a close as quickly as they did 
and far under budget.
Figure 4: Family Holding Land on a Regraded Site in Ayn al-Hilwah
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2. Other Comments. UNRWA engineers noted that clearance was 
facilitated by assignment of John Pedigo, Brown & Root, who 
helped develop methodology and selected contractors for 
clearance.
C . Water Supply:
1. Status. UNRWA engineers have reconnected or reinstalled 
most of the water mains and laterals. In the more heavily 
damaged camps in the south, new systems had to be installed 
in large areas of the camps.
2. Problems. The people in the camps had direct supply to 
their houses before the war. The new systems in the south­
ern camps supply water to scattered water points. There 
has been some vandalism of water points and washstands due 
to (a) resentment that water is not being piped to each 
house site; (b) the fact that water points were placed on 
land previously occupied and owners want the land back; and 
(c) some neighboring families want water points moved away 
from their houses to reduce mud and runoff that gets onto 
their land, and to reduce noise and trespassing. These 
problems are minor and will sort themselves out; however, 
better design of the facilities and better siting would 
have reduced the problems. NOTE: The system cannot be ex­
panded at a later date to add direct supply to houses due 
to low capacity and head in 3/4" pipes. For service to 
houses, new lines will have to be installed.
Figure 5: A Water Point in Use
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D. Sanitation:
1. Status. There are currently no plans to provide latrines 
or sanitation units. In normal times each family dug its 
own pit latrine. The soils in most areas do not allow for 
much filtration and, when the pits fill with liquids, the 
overflow drains outside the house and into the storm 
drains, most of which are open box culverts in the center 
of pathways or in the streets. When solids fill the pit, 
it has to be pumped, dug out, or closed. In many areas, 
sewage has penetrated outside the latrines causing unsani­
tary conditions. In camp areas that have been filled and 
where soils have not been compacted, this problem may be 
expected to increase.
Figure 6: Latrine Drainpipe Emptying into Storm Drain
2. Recommendations. A simple system that would be compati­
ble with the usual method adopted by the refugees is the 
"aqua privy". These are large, round concrete or fiber­
glass containers that are placed in the ground. Each has 
one or two squatting plates on top which drain into a pipe 
that extends down into the middle of the tank. Two addi­
tional pipes are installed at the top of the tank. One 
bleeds methane gas out the top and the other serves as an
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FAMILY-TYPE AQUA PRIVY USING 90-CM- OR 120-CM- (3-FT- OR 4-FT-) DIAMETER 
CONCRETE SEWER PIPE FOR THE TANK
Measurements shown are in centimetres.
A =  Outlet to soakage trench or soakage pit 
B =  Removable, reinforced concrete cover slab 
C =  2.5-cm- (1-in.-) diameter pipe ventilation
D =  Tank capacity varies with diameter and length of sewer pipe used
E =  90-cm- or 120-cm- (3-ft- or 4-ft-) diameter concrete sewer pipe, 90 cm (3 ft) long or more, 
sealed with concrete at lower end
Figure 7: Aqua Privy
(Source: E.G. Wagner and J.N. Lanoix, Excreta Disposal for Rural 
Areas and Small Communities, World Health Organization, Geneva, 
1958, p .  83.)
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overflow. The overflow collects liquid waste from a rela­
tively safe area of the tank and drains it outside. On a 
temporary basis, this liquid can be drained into the storm 
drain without too much danger; but later small pipes can be 
installed to collect and drain the outfall and carry it to 
a safe disposal or treatment area. The solids in the aqua 
privy will eventually have to be removed. Frequency of de- 
sludging depends on the size of the units, but some can 
safely be used for a year or more if the size is large 
enough. It is highly recommended that such a system be 
considered.
E. Waste Collection and Disposal:
1. Status and Usual Method. Refuse collection is a minor 
problem that could pose a health hazard as more people re­
turn to the camps. At present rubbish is simply dumped in 
the streets and collected by a team with shovels and wheel­
barrows. This is the way it is done in normal times as 
well. The engineering staff has proposed placing garbage 
barrels at key locations throughout the camps, but previous 
experience indicates that they will be taken by the refu­
gees .
2. Recomendation. In other situations, use of garbage bar­
rels has also proven unworkable. A better system, and one 
that coincides with existing practice, is to issue plastic 
garbage bags to refugees. The system will work as usual, 
but at least the garbage will not be scattered. The bags 
are not expensive and, if they are issued free of cost for 
six months, it should encourage people to use the method 
and, when they have their own incomes back, they should 
continue this system at their own expense.
F. Housing and Shelter:
1. Status of the Refugees. All refugees have shelter. Many
are living in schools, with relatives, in partially damaged 
buildings, or in newly-built temporary shelters or recon­
structed houses. No one is in the open. (See shelter 
photos on following page.)
Self-help reconstruction efforts by the refugees are out­
pacing the efforts of UNRWA. Some reconstruction is al­
ready complete, aided in part by contributions from family 
and friends overseas. Reports that the PLO is channelling 
large amounts directly to the people are exaggerated, but 
there is no doubt that some people have received support
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Figure 10:
New and Repaired 
Houses (Ayn al- 
Hilwah)
20
from the PLO in the form of their regular martyrs' pay­
ments, etc.
The level and pace of reconstruction seems to have sur­
prised UNRWA. But in fact, if more men were present, most 
of the camps would probably have been rebuilt by now. In 
the consultant's opinion, UNRWA has shown little initiative 
or leadership on this issue. This is due primarily to 
political reasons, especially the question of whether or 
not the Palestinians would be allowed to remain and, if so, 
which ones —  the original refugees and dependents from 
1948 only, or those from 1967 and 1970 also. Not wanting 
to antagonize the Government of Lebanon, UNRWA has main­
tained the position that they are only providing temporary 
shelter (tents). Rather than advocating a more realistic 
policy or examining closely other shelter methods which 
could have contributed to permanent reconstruction when 
permission was given, UNRWA has opted for a costly policy 
of providing tents (imported from Pakistan), bases of tiles 
to set them on, and a block wall approximately 60cm. high 
to provide "protection". UNRWA argued that, if long-term 
permission to remain was given, the partial structures 
could be converted to permanent buildings. The problems 
are:
o --  the people did not want tents;--  block walls require foundations.
Thus the few tents erected were quickly torn down by the 
refugees.
Figure 11: Abandoned, Destroyed Tent Bases (Ayn al-Hilwah)
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2. Current Housing & Shelter Program of UNRWA. The current 
plan is to provide a combination of materials and cash to 
each family for rebuilding, plus one tent, according to the 
following allocation and schedule:
Phase I: Phase I is designed to provide funds and mater­
ials to people whose houses were damaged beyond repair and 
who are totally without a house of their own now. It is 
intended for refugees living in the camps* now and is 
generally for those who were considered residents of the 
camp before the war. In the south (Sidon and Tyre) people 
will receive a cash allotment based on the size of their 
family according to the following formula:**
1-6 people: 3000££
7-12 people: 6000££
13+ people: 9000££
In addition, people who are reassigned land must agree to 
accept a tent.
In Beirut, building materials will be provided in lieu of 
cash. People will be interviewed to determine their needs 
and will be eligible for up to 1000 cement blocks, 26 zinc- 
laminated roofing sheets, 20 wooden roof beams, and 20 bags 
(1 ton) of cement, depending on family size and other 
factors. (There is no tent requirement in Beirut.) Both 
the amount of materials and the equivalent value of the 
materials were determined by estimating the amount of 
materials required to build a small two-room cement block 
house with 28m floor space. The hypothetical structure 
or "design" would have a roof made of corrugated metal 
sheets laminated with zinc. The price does not include 
windows, doors, or window/door frames which UNRWA hopes 
will be provided by PVO contributions.
Eligibility will be determined on the basis of a survey 
conducted immediately after the war. Notices were posted 
around the camps instructing the refugees to go to a 
central place in each camp and register their housing 
losses with the school teachers. People were asked to
*The term "in camps" used here refers to people living on land 
legally dedicated to UNRWA by the Government of Lebanon.
**The amounts per family were increased to the present levels after 
the field work for this report was concluded. The original amounts 
were 2000££, 4000££, and 6000££.
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describe their housing losses as "totally destroyed", 
"partially destroyed", or "minor damage". There was no 
verification except that the school teachers, being 
residents of the camps themselves, often knew the people 
and could detect exaggerated claims. However, in the south 
many people appear to have actually underestimated their 
damages, while in Beirut damages were usually overesti­
mated .*
UNRWA estimates that 3,900 families will be eligible for 
Phase I assistance in the south. This number was derived 
by estimate based on the following: In a survey conducted
in July and August, 55,000 people were listed as homeless 
in the south (36,000 in Tyre and 19,000 in Sidon). This 
number was divided by an average family size of 5.7 to get 
an estimated 10,000 families. From experience, UNRWA 
estimated the ratio of camp residents to those living out­
side camps to be 50/50% (or 5000/5000). For planning 
purposes, an estimate of in-camp families who lost homes 
and would be eligible for Phase I assistance was placed at 
65% of in-camp residents, thus making approximately 3,900 
families in the south. After two weeks of cash disburse­
ments, the average grant was 3866££ per family. For 
planning purposes, UNRWA raised this to 4000££.
Thus UNRWA now projects a total cost of approximately 
US$3.9 million for Phase I grants in the south. In Beirut 
UNRWA estimates that 365 families will be eligible for 
Phase I materials and that the program will cost approxi­
mately US$375,000. The total cost of Phase I is estimated 
to be approximately US$4,275,000.
Part I has already commenced and over half the people eli­
gible to be served in the south have been served.
(Originally UNRWA proposed a second part to Phase I. This 
was a program to provide assistance to people living 
outside the camps. However, the Lebanese Government 
opposed assistance to people outside the camps since often 
they often occupy land illegally. UNRWA estimated that 
approximately 3,500 families would be eligible for this 
program, for an estimated 1.8 million US dollars. Never­
theless, the program was not approved.)
*Source: Camp service officers
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Phase II: To help families with damaged houses, UNRWA
proposes to give grants of 2000££ to each family living 
in camps that claimed a damaged house in the teachers' 
survey. In the south, an estimated 2,340 will be eligible; 
in Beirut, surveys have determined approximately 775 people 
will be eligible. Initially UNRWA estimated a total Phase 
II budget of approximately 2.3 million US dollars (1.9 
million for the south; approximately $400,000 for Beirut). 
In the south, the total grant will be by paid in cash with 
no adjustments made. In Beirut, disbursements will be made 
according to a survey of families and adjusted according to 
need to a maximum of 2000££.
Phase III: To help families who have already rebuilt
their houses without waiting for assistance, UNRWA proposes 
to provide a cash grant of 1250££ to people living in 
camps. The estimated number of recipients in the south is 
260 families, for an estimated cost of US$132,000. Esti­
mates of those eligible in Beirut were not available at the 
time of this report.
3. Additional Assistance to Refugees in Need of Housing. A 
few additional offers of financial and material assistance 
have been made. The Hariri Family-supported Islamic Foun­
dation has offered to provide matching funds to refugees in 
Sidon. For each family eligible for the 9000££ cash 
grant from UNRWA, the Foundation will provide 2500££; 
families eligible for 6000££ will receive 2000££; and 
those eligible for 3000££ will receive 1500££.
UNRWA has also stated that Save the Children (UK) and World 
Vision have offered to assist. SCF will provide doors and 
windows for houses in Burj al-Barajinah, and World Vision 
will provide the same for new houses in Shatila.
4. Observations on UNRWA Shelter Assistance Package. The 
basic idea of providing cash and/or building materials can­
not be faulted. The idea is sound and, since most families 
have experience with building, it is the most convenient 
way to support reconstruction. However, it would have 
made more sense to start with what UNRWA is calling Phase 
II. Since this is overall a reconstruction program, money 
to stimulate repair should have gone out first (or at least 
at the same time as money for new construction). This 
would have helped get people re-established, promoted acti­
vity in the camps, and increased the available shelter in 
the camps.
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Second, UNRWA took a long time to adopt and develop this 
approach. Surely this could have been part of a general 
preparedness or contingency plan.
Third, it appears that no effort is being made to help peo­
ple maximize their purchasing power. UNRWA simply disbur­
ses the funds. The result will be that individual families 
will have to buy in an inflationary market. By either pur­
chasing in bulk and re-selling at cost, or by assisting as 
an intermediary, the costs could be brought down. (The 
system used in Beirut of giving out materials in lieu of 
cash will serve this same purpose, although the system used 
in the south is preferable as it allows the refugees more 
flexibility.)
Fourth, UNRWA is providing no technical or engineering 
assistance directly to the refugees. Most repair and re­
construction to date is of a very poor standard. Some con­
structions are unsafe. UNRWA should provide a team of 
architects, engineers and construction journeymen to advise 
builders on low-cost methods to improve buildings and to 
demonstrate safe ways to cut costs.
Finally, the fact that people who have already rebuilt are 
receiving the smallest allotment seems to be penalizing 
those with initiative.
5. Structural Problems Likely to be Encountered.
a. Differential Settling: Since many houses are built
on uncompacted fill, some degree of differential 
settling can be expected. This will have only minor 
effect on single-story buildings, but two- and three- 
story structures may experience more critical 
structural problems.
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Figure 12: Clearing an Entrance to a Repaired House (Ayn al-Hilwah).
Note the height of the road and regraded land adjacent to the house.
b. Foundations: Few newly-reconstructed buildings have
deep foundations due to the people's reluctance to dig 
down into the ground for fear of finding unexploded 
bombs. Lack of good foundations may have an effect on 
the safety of new multiple-story buildings because the 
foundation may not be strong enough to hold them. As 
the filled areas settle, buildings may rock and be 
damaged.
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6. Summary of Useful Figures from Housing Program (from 
UNRWA).o
a. Number of people in need of shelter: 94,796 (Source: 
survey).
b. Number of families in need of shelter: 17,000 (based 
on dividing total number of people by 5.7, the average 
size of a Palestinian family).
c. Number of families currently in camps in Beirut and 
south: 14,161
d. Number of families currently outside of camps: 15,000
e. Number of families estimated to participate in:
Phase 1..........4,265
Phase I I ........3,115
Phase III........  325 (estimate by consultant)
f. Estimated average grant per family for:
Phase I ........3865££
Phase I I ........2000££
Phase III........1250££
g. Estimated number of blocks to build a 28m house:
1,000
2h. Average size of lot apportioned by UNRWA: _+87m
G . Drainage:
1. Status. Most storm drains, culverts and gutters were re­
placed or rebuilt in the regrading of the camps. There are 
no major problems at present, although settling of roads in 
the next few months may necessitate repairs next spring.
2. Recommendation. Set aside funds for minor repairs.
H. Schools: Many schools that are still standing are being used
for shelter or other purposes. When they are vacated, some re­
habilitation work will be required.
UNRWA engineers have done their best to try to save existing 
facilities, repairing some structures that in other situations 
would have been written off. They should be cited for their in­
sistence on repair for it will save the program millions of dol­
lars. UNRWA may want to consider having the repairs checked by 
a structural engineer since this is an earthquake zone and the 
buildings are frequently occupied to capacity.
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I. Clinics, Hospitals, Supplementary Feeding Centers: Most medi­
cal facilities received repairable damage. To date, UNRWA has 
attempted to repair as many facilities in the camps as possible. 
In Ayn al-Hilwah the main clinic was heavily damaged and lost 
one wing, but the remainder has been successfully repaired.
The hospital on the eastern border of Ayn al-Hilwah has been the 
subject of some debate. UNICEF has proposed building a new hos­
pital, while others suggest repairing the existing facility.
The damage is only to non-load-bearing walls on the exterior.
The frame and columns appear intact, the foundation is sound, 
and most interior walls only need to have smoke marks washed 
off. Even extensive interior redesign would be economically 
feasible.
Figure 13: Lebanese Government's Ayn al-Hilwah Hospital in Sidon
J. Circulation Systems:
1. Status. All roads have been regraded where necessary and 
many have been resurfaced with rock and gravel.
2. Future Plans. After the rainy season there are plans to 
resurface all roads with asphalt. There is some criticism 
of this as being too extravagant, but it will help keep the
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camps clean, keep drainage from undermining the buildings, 
and reduce settling problems. If no action is taken on in­
stalling sanitation systems, then hard-surfaced streets and 
paths will be absolutely necessary to keep waste water 
moving out of the camp. (Earth or gravel roads and paths 
will encourage water to pond, and drains will be constantly 
clogged with debris and rocks.)
K. Light and Power:
1. Status. Electrical systems in most southern camps will 
have to be replaced entirely. In some camps, especially in 
Beirut, electricity should be available soon, but there are 
unconfirmed reports that the municipality will not recon­
nect the system.
2. Recommendation. For security purposes, it is important 
to provide as much light as possible to the camps. The 
Government of Lebanon should be asked to restore electri­
city as soon as possible. As an interim solution, Coleman- 
style lanterns should be donated to each household.
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR OBSERVATIONS
Major Issues in the Camps
A. Land: Due to mismanagement and lack of planning, there will
be a shortage of land in several camps. In Ayn al-Hilwah, 10% - 
15% of the people there now will not have land assigned to them. 
If other families return, the situation will become critical.
B. Security: UNRWA is gradually withdrawing its small inter­
national staff in the camps. The lack of a substantial foreign 
presence to serve as observers unsettles the refugees and could 
lead to increased exploitation by outsiders, especially in camps 
"protected" by the Haddad Militia. Before the war, the PLO and 
the various militias provided protection for the refugees; their 
departure has created a vacuum and opened the camps to exploita­
tion and harassment from outside. This lack of security will 
necessarily lead people to seek reinstatement of PLO or PLO-like 
organizations to reduce their vulnerablity. A large expatriate 
presence would reduce the feeling of exposure and might also 
inhibit the PLO from making an overt early return to the camps.
C. Housing: Most refugees believe the UNRWA housing program is
too little and very late. People whose houses were totally des­
troyed and who lived on land that was cleared and replatted 
resent having to relocate even if only by a few feet. They feel 
they have been doubly hurt —  once by the bombing, and once by 
UNRWA.
Future Political Issues
A. Equity Between Palestinians and Lebanese: The Lebanese public
and government are becoming resentful of the high level of at­
tention given to the needs of the Palestinians. The high stan­
dard of service to Palestinians before the war was much resented 
then, and this feeling is not likely to decrease. The U.S. 
should encourage a general reduction in some of the services and 
development of more self-help activities to reduce the appear­
ance of pampering the Palestinians.
B. Expansion of Camps: A number of factors are going to necessi­
tate an increase in camp lands. The U.S. should encourage UNRWA 
to develop plans now and if possible to obtain leases on land
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adjacent to or very near the camps. (Non-Palestinians near the 
camps may be willing to sell or lease now just to get out of the 
line of fire.) It will be more difficult and expensive to get 
land in the future and may be politically impossible.
C. UNRWA Control Inside Camps: Control over land and reconstruc­
tion in the southern camps has already been lost. If UNRWA fur­
ther withdraws and no foreign presence is established, adminis­
trative control will also be lost. The basic camp administra­
tive structure should be reconsidered and a permanent or resi­
dent expatriate staff should be put into each camp.
UNRWA: An Overall Assessment
UNRWA can best be likened to HHS: it is big, slow, bureaucratic 
and not innovative. It does not lead, it follows. It can vastly im­
prove its performance, but without outside prodding it is unlikely to 
do so. It has been unfairly criticized for not taking more of a lead 
and being "another UNHCR". Yet UNRWA's role is not to lead but to 
administer, to manage a program of health, education and welfare pro­
grams for a country of people without a country. By and large in 
normal periods they do this well. In the emergency, UNRWA continued 
to operate in the old way with the old procedures. This was their 
main failure. Emergencies such as this could have been anticipated, 
and streamlined responses and contingency plans could have been 
prepared.
As a result of this experience, UNRWA should be encouraged to 
conduct a detailed evaluation and use the findings to develop organi­
zational changes to help better prepare for emergency operations. An 
Emergencies Unit should be established and emergency procedures pre­
pared. The Unit should be made up of operational field people, and 
standing arrangements for working with operational partners should be 
made.
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APPENDIX II:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE 
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES OF UNRWA
UNRWA's poor performance in field operations is a result of lack 
of emergency operations capabilities in the field, lack of training 
or experience in emergency operations, and problems due to its struc­
ture and bureaucratic systems. In order to reduce the problems and 
improve field performance, the following steps are recommended:
1• Conduct a detailed management study of UNRWA. This study 
should include:
a. A review of UNRWA's system of organization;
b. An examination of lines of authority within the organiza­
tion to determine ways in which operational decisions 
having little or no political significance could be made at 
the field level, and to determine ways of establishing 
better coordination at the lower levels of the organiza­
tion;
c. A review of decision-making procedures to determine changes 
in the table of organization which could streamline deci­
sions in an emergency;
d. An examination of project management capabilities and pro­
cedures for field level operations. This review would 
include:
1) Examination of UNRWA's ability to monitor and assess 
field projects, and
2) Determination of the personnel and staffing patterns 
required in order to improve field level performance.
2. Establish an emergency operations/preparedness unit. UNRWA
can expect to be periodically engaged in some form of emergency 
operations. It is therefore imperative that UNWRA develop a 
permanent field emergency operations capability and that ade­
quate steps be taken to prepare and train personnel for emer­
gency service in the field. An emergency unit similar to that 
established by the UNHCR should be established at UNRWA's 
headquarters with personnel who are recruited for their techni­
cal capabilities and trained in emergency operations and the 
required technologies. As part of their terms of reference, 
personnel in the unit should be prepared to go to the field at a 
moment's notice for periods of not less than 1 year.
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Funding for the emergency unit should enable it to acquire 
training for field operations. The unit should have computer 
capabilities to enable it to develop resource lists and consul­
tant rosters, and to tie into the existing emergency materials 
stockpiles of other agencies.
In setting up this unit, special emergency operations procedures 
should be established to enable it to operate as expeditiously 
in the field as possible.
3. Develop methods for helping UNRWA operationally. Many of the
services required by refugees in an emergency can be provided by 
other organizations operating under contract or in partnership 
with UNRWA. UNRWA should be encouraged to expand its contact 
with voluntary agencies, professional relief experts and 
specialized consultants. By contracting other agencies that 
have these skills, UNRWA will be better prepared for emergency 
operations and able to offer a full range of services without 
having to maintain a large staff.
Recommendations for improving operational capabilities could 
include:
a. Establishment of a joint UNRWA/VOLAG advisory and coordina­
tion group or committee.
b. Establishment of a VOLAG liaison officer or office to pro­
mote and develop contacts between UNRWA and potential 
operating partners.
c. Establishment of standing agreements with voluntary agen­
cies, professional relief experts and specialized consult­
ing firms to provide services in an emergency.
d. Establishment of a roster of specialized service officers 
and/or consultants to assist in emergency operations.
These individuals would be screened and organized into 
teams, and would receive specialized training prior to 
assignment in an emergency operation. Standby contracts 
for teams could be offered for terras up to 2 years with no 
obligations unless an emergency occurs.
4• Establish emergency operations training as a part of UNRWA
staff development. UNRWA staff should receive orientation and 
training in emergency operations. Training modules could be 
prepared that would provide training to UNRWA staff at the entry 
level as well as specialized management training for senior 
administrative personnel on various aspects of emergency opera­
tions. Because UNRWA has been set up to deal with refugees, all 
career personnel should be familiar with the requirements of 
emergency operations and the basic techniques/technologies that 
are used to provide emergency services.
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5. Establish an Inspector General. In order to stimulate UNRWA 
to get its own house in order, donors may want to consider 
establishing the position of Inspector General within UNRWA.
The Inspector General would be appointed by a committee of the 
major donors and would report to the Commissioner General of 
UNRWA as well as to the donors' committee. The Inspector 
General would be an ombudsman with authority to examine at his 
own discretion various aspects of the operations of UNRWA and to 
report on ways in which the operation could be improved. The 
Inspector General should have a separate budget that would 
enable him to hire management consultants as well as relief 
specialists to examine the full range of UNRWA's operational 
capabilities. The Inspector General should be appointed to a 
non-renewable term of 3 years so that different perspectives and 
fresh ideas could be brought into the process.
6. Strengthen the oversight capability. At the present time, the 
Commissioner General of UNRWA reports directly to the General 
Assembly. There is an Advisory Committee (made up of a mixture 
of representatives from host countries and donors); however, it 
only meets once a year to review the annual report. Some form 
of oversight organization should be established by the donors to 
ensure that UNRWA improves its performance and operational capa­
bilities. Care should be taken to appoint an oversight commit­
tee that can truly evaluate the operations of the organization.
A large, political committee like UNHCR's Ex-Com where decision­
making is made difficult, due to the large number of persons and 
countries involved, should be avoided. A donor—selected commit­
tee made up of various experts such as management specialists, 
financial and accounting experts, operations specialists, etc., 
could provide periodic review of UNRWA's activities. The com­
mittee would report to the donors as well as to the General 
Assembly.
If the above recommendations are carried out, it should be 
possible to improve UNRWA's performance to a great degree. These 
measures should help UNRWA to streamline operations, improve their 
performance in the field, and reduce overall costs.
Frederick C. Cuny 
INTERTECT 
January 1983
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